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With the possible exception of international peace and security, global economic development
has been the dominant theme in international law and international relations since the end of the
Second World War. The tenor and intensity has varied over the decades, but the objectives, cen-
tering on institutional arrangements and programs to promote the global economy, have remained
the same. Broches’ collection of essays, originally written between 1957 and 1992, attests to his
intimate knowledge of the workings of the IBRD and its related agencies. In addition to provid-
ing both the history and the jurisprudential analysis of these institutions, these essays constitute a
discourse on public as well as private international law. They contribute, moreover, to a progres-
sive development of the international law of foreign investment. Essentially, this is a book about
arbitration and dispute settlement, with its history told and explained by one who was present at
its creation. Broches puts international arbitration into both the contexts of private and public in-
ternational law.
This book contains twenty-five essays and is divided into six parts: (1) the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development; (2) Registration of Treaties and International Agreements;
(3) the International Center for the Settlement of Investment of Disputes; (4) International Com-
mercial Arbitration; (5) Investment Disputes; and (6) a section devoted to miscellaneous topics.
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ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK ICSID
AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW
Reviewed by Victor Essien*
With the possible exception of international peace and se-
curity, global economic development has been the dominant
theme in international law and international relations since the
end of the Second World War.' The tenor and intensity has
varied over the decades, but the objectives, centering on institu-
tional arrangements and programs to promote the global econ-
omy, have remained the same.
The institutional arrangements started with the twin organi-
zations of the Bretton Woods Conference2 and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 3 ("IBRD"), popularly
known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
("IMF").4 While the IMF has been charged with regulating the
international monetary system,5 IBRD's operations have concen-
trated on financing for global economic development.6 The
IBRD created the International Finance Corporation7 ("IFC") in
* LL.B.(Hons.) 1973, LL.M. 1976, University of Ghana, LL.M. (Int'l), 1982, J.S.D.,
1985, New York University, Member, Ghana and New York Bars, International Law Li-
brarian and Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; formerly Legal
Assistant, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1986; Consultant,
United Nations Centre for Transactional Corporations, 1989-1992.
1. EvAN LUARD, THE UNITED NATIONS: How IT WORKS AND WHAT IT DOES 8 (2d ed.
1994).
2. See generally BRETrON WOODS REVISITED (A.L.K. Acheson et al. eds., 1972).
3. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD") was established in 1945 as a specialized
agency of the United Nations ("U.N."). Id.
4. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") was established in
1945. Id.
5. See generally ERIK HOFFMEYER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: AN ESSAY
IN INTERPRETATION (1992) (discussing international monetary policy and role of IMF).
6. See generally IBRAHiM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SE-
LECGrED ESSAYS (1991 ) (accounting history and development of World Bank).
7. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, May 25, 1955,
7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117.
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1955 and the International Development Association' ("IDA") in
1960 in order to enlarge its risk capital portfolio and provide less
burdensome loans.9 The IBRD further launched its dispute set-
tlement institution by creating the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Dispute10 ("ICSID") in 1965 and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 1 ("MIGA") in 1988.
These instruments attempt to foster security in international in-
vestments.
1 2
Apart from MIGA, which was created more recently, Aron
Broches was intimately connected with the formation of each of
the institutions associated with the IBRD. In the case of ICSID,
Broches is frequently referred to as its creator. 3 Broches' collec-
tion of essays, originally written between 1957 and 1992, attests
to his intimate knowledge of the workings of the IBRD and its
related agencies. In addition to providing both the history and
the jurisprudential analysis of these institutions, these essays con-
stitute a discourse on public as well as private international law.
They contribute, moveover, to a progressive development of the
international law of foreign investment.
This book contains twenty-five essays and is divided into six
parts: (1) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment; (2) Registration of Treaties and International Agree-
ments; (3) the International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment of Disputes; (4) International Commercial Arbitration (5)
Investment Disputes; and (6) a section devoted to miscellaneous
topics.
The lead essay in Part I is titled "International Legal Aspects
8. Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, Jan, 26,
1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249.
9. See HOFFMEYER, supra note 5, at 33-39 (discussing changes in IBRD structure that
led to better exchange rates and diversification).
10. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
Convention].
11. World Bank: Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598.
12. See Malcolm Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of
Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HtAv. INT'L L.J. 103, 103-44
(1992) (discussing recent activities of International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes ("ICSID") and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA")).
13. Stephen M. Schwebel, forward to ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD
BANY, ICSID AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw at ix
(1995).
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of the Operations of the World Bank." Written in 1959, it was
originally published as part of the courses on international law
given at the Hague Academy.14 Its pedagogical value is at once
perceptible. In a sense, it reads like a course on public interna-
tional law using the World Bank as a case study. It touches on
the subjects of, among other things, international law, state-
hood, sovereignty, international personality, international or-
ganization, treaty-making capacity, and the registration of trea-
ties. 1 5
In this essay, the analysis of the term "international person-
ality" is most instructive. He takes to task those writers like Op-
penheim16 and Lauterpacht 7 who, when at pains to distinguish
between states and international organizations, claim that States
are entities that possess "full, perfect and normal" international
personality while international organizations have less than full
international personality.'8 In response, Broches flatly states
that "[t]here seems to be no need for gradations in personal-
ity."19 International personality is a quality that an entity either
does or does not possess. Therefore, if an entity possesses inter-
national rights and can act on the international plane, then it is
an international person.20
According to Broches, the World Bank is an international
person. He arrives at this conclusion applying the reasoning of
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in the Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the U.N., 1 when the court had to
decide on the international personality of the United Nations
("U.N."). In this case, the ICJ ruled that the U.N .Charter had
conferred on the organization a complex bundle of rights and
obligations where it was impossible to operate "except on the
international plane and as between parties possessing interna-
14. ARON BROCHES, SE LECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1995).
15. Id.
16. See 1 LASSA F.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 117-18 (1955).
Oppenheim asserted that a "full sovereign state" is an international person, while a
"not-full sovereign state" is only subject to international law in a limited capacity. Id.
17. SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNITY 166 (1966). "The Sovereign State does not acknowledge a central executive
authority above itself." Id.
18. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 16.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 22.
21. 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) (advisory opinion).
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tional personality."22 By the same token, Broches argues that the
Articles of Agreement establishing the World Bank conferred on
the Bank certain rights and obligations. "The Bank, being.., a
subject of international law .... it possesses international person-
ality."23
Part I, Chapter Two discusses how the activities of the World
Bank have influenced the development of international law.
This chapter also details the creation of the IFC, the IDA, and
the ICSID.24 With regard to establishing these organizations,
Broches explains that the Bank acted outside of its day to day
operations in order to sponsor the establishment of new interna-
tional relationships.25
Part I, Chapter Three covers the role of the World Bank in
international transactions. It reflects the missionary zeal with
which Aron Broches undertook his work at the Bank and also
the way the World Bank sees itself in the international invest-
ment process. Essentially, in the relationship between capital-
exporting developed countries and capital-importing developing
countries, the World Bank sees itself as a neutral facilitator work-
ing towards bringing the two parties together in a financially
sound and mutually rewarding partnership.26
Part II addresses the registration of treaties and interna-
tional agreements. Article 102 of the U.N. Charter requires the
registration of all treaties and international agreements entered
into by any Member State and provides sanctions for non-com-
pliance. 27 Broches, after considering the practice of the World
Bank with respect to registration pursuant to Article 102, con-
cludes that the Bank has not registered any agreements other
than loan and guarantee agreements and related documents.28
Broches then examines the attitude of the ICJ and its failure
to address treaty non-registration by reviewing five cases where
the issue of registration should have been raised but was ignored
22. 1949 I.C.J. at 179.
23. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 22.
24. Id. at 79-84.
25. Id. at 79.
26. See id. at 96 (discussing how World Bank's neutral position permits it to exert
considerable influence over form and substance of transactions).
27. Id. at 100.
28. Id. at 129.
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by the Court in their resolution of the disputes. 29  These cases
are the Corfu Channel Case,3" The Asylum Case,"1 the Case of the
Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943 ,32 The Anglo-Iranian
Case,13 and the Electricite de Beyrouth Case.34 Based on this review,
Broches concludes, first, that the Court will not apply the pen-
alty of Article 102(2) to every instance of non-compliance with
the mandate of registration 3 and, second, that none of the in-
stances in which the Court permitted unregistered or belatedly
registered agreements to be invoked violated the spirit of Article
102.36 The better view, of course, is that the non-compliance of
the Article 102 mandate has never been the ratio decidendi of any
known ICJ case.
In truth, this issue has never really been before the ICJ.
Consequently, there is no indication of how the Court would ap-
ply the Article 102(2) sanction. As the 1994 postscript to this
essay indicates, the position of the law on these issues has not
changed since 1957, when the article was first written.
Part III is devoted to the ICSID. In ten essays, Broches dis-
sects this dispute resolution institution and delves into the provi-
sions of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of Other States3 7 ("Conven-
tion"), which formed and governs the ICSID. He discusses,
among other things, jurisdiction, applicable law and default pro-
cedure, arbitration clauses versus institutional arbitration, case
studies of ICSID arbitrations and the finality of ICSID awards.
Several of the essays reprise the question of the jurisdiction
of the ICSID. Broches emphasizes that consent is the "corner-
stone of the jurisdiction of the centre"a3 and that consent must
be given by both parties and in writing. Using the Report of the
Executive Directors ("Report") that accompanied the text of the
Convention3 9 as travaux preparatoires, Broches delves into the
29. Id. at 130-58.
30. 1949 I.CJ. 244 (Dec. 15) (judgment).
31. 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) (judgment).
32. 1954 LCJ. 19 (june 15) (preliminary question and judgment).
33. 1952 I.CJ. 93 (July 22) (preliminary objection and judgment).
34. 1953 I.C.J. 41 (Oct. 20) (order).
35. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 144.
36. Id.
37. Convention, supra note 10, 17 U.S.T. at 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. at 159.
38. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 168.
39. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNVATIONAL LAW
meaning and significance of Article 25(1) of the Convention.4"
He suggests that the context of Article 25(1) indicates that one
of the parties to the dispute must be a Contracting State and the
other a national of another Contracting State.41 In other words,
private versus private and state versus state disputes are excluded
from the jurisdiction of the ICSID. Furthermore, the non-state
party must be a "national of another Contracting State."4 2
Article 25(2) (b), however, provides an exception for juridi-
cal persons that, by reason of requirements of local incorpora-
tion, may be nationals of the state party to the dispute. In such a
situation, it maymeet the jurisdictional requirements if the state
party to the dispute had agreed to treat it as a national of an-
other Contracting State because of foreign control.43
In discussing jurisdiction ratione materiae, Broches sheds
light on what Article 25(1) defines as a "legal dispute arising di-
rectly out of an investment." Broches confides that during the
negotiations surrounding the formation of the Convention, the
drafters considered and rejected several definitions of "invest-
ment." Ultimately, the drafters decided to dispense with a defi-
nition for "investment" because it would be taken care of by the
consensual nature of the jurisdiction."
The Report also indicates that the legal dispute must involve
a "conflict of rights" as opposed to a "conflict of interests." In
addition, "[t]he dispute must concern the existence or scope of
a legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the repara-
tion to be made for breach of legal obligation."45 Broches ex-
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4
I.L.M. 524, 524-32 [hereinafter Report].
40. Convention, supra note 10, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 174-
75.
Article 25(1) states:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly
out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivi-
sion of agreement of a Contracting State) and a national of another Con-
tracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to
the Centre. When the parties have given their, consent, no party may with-
draw its consent unilaterally.
Id.
41. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 167.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 168.
44. Id. at 208.
45. Report, supra note 39, 4 I.L.M. at 528; BROCHES, supra note 14, at 208.
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plains how the parties give their consent and notes that a con-
sent once given cannot be unilaterally withdrawn.46
Broches further explains that, under the Convention, the
home country of the investor may not invoke diplomatic protec-
tion.47
From the legal point of view, the most striking feature of the
convention is that it firmly establishes the capacity of a private
individual or a corporation to proceed directly against a State
in an international forum, thus contributing to the growing
recognition of the individual as a subject of international
law. 48
After a closer study of Convention Article 27,11 which deals with
invocation of diplomatic protection, Broches concludes that the
Article does not operate as a permanent bar to diplomatic pro-
tection and that it may be revived if the Contracting State fails to
abide by and comply with an award in favor of the investor.5 0
Furthermore, it is within the rights of the investor's home state
to engage in informal diplomatic exchanges in order to facilitate
the settlement of a dispute. 51
In discussing applicable law, Broches distinguishes between
procedural and substantive law.52 With respect to the proce-
dural law, Broches takes the view that the Convention, being a
treaty, constitutes the lexfori55 and as such excludes the applica-
bility of any national la loi de l'arbitrage54 except where the Con-
vention specifically refers to it.55
46. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 200.
47. Id. at 214.
48. Id. at 198.
49. Convention, supra note 10, art. 27, 17 U.S.T. at 1281, 575 U.N.T.S. at 176.
50. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 198.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 220-32.
53. See 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 875 (2d ed. 1989). Lexfori is the latin
term for the law of the country in which an action is brought as determining the nature
and mode of the proceeding. Id.
54. See BROCHES, supra note 14, at 221-22. La loi de l'arbitrage is the French termi-
nology for latin term lexfori, which means that law of the country in which the tribunal
is seated is the law that governs procedure. Id.
55. Broches, supra note 14, at 224. Broches refers to the relevant sections of the
Convention that spell out this la loi de l'arbitragr. Articles 37 to 40, on the composition
of the arbitral tribunal; Articles 56 to 58, on the replacement and disqualification or
arbitrators; Article 45, on failure of a party to appear; Article 43, on production of
evidence, and; Article 44, on the right of the tribunal to decide on questions of proce-
dure not covered by the Convention. Id. at 224-25.
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On the question of the applicable substantive law, Broches
points out that unlike the procedural law provisions, which are
scattered throughout the Convention, only Article 42 deals with
substantive law.56 Article 42 acknowledges the party autonomy
principle. In the absence of an agreement by the parties, how-
ever, the law of the Contracting State party, including its rules
on conflict of laws and relevant rules of international law, will
apply."
With regard to the question of the hierarchy between inter-
national and national law within the context of Article 42,
Broches concludes that international law is superior to national
law.58 This conclusion, however, is arrived at through a self-con-
trived analytical process. Broches asserts that an arbitral tribunal
will first look to the law of the host state and that state law will, in
the first instance, be applied to the merits of the dispute. The
result will then be tested against international law to determine
whether or not it violates international law. If it does, then the
substantive law will not be applied.59
While Broches argues that the Report supports his position
with regard to the supremacy of international law in this realm,6 °
in actuality, the Report does not contribute to this contention.
Neither the text of the Convention nor the Report provide a hi-
erarchy of national and international law. Rather, this is a posi-
tion that has worked its way through as a result of ICSID case
law, and, in particular, the decision of the first ad hoc Commit-
tee in Klockner et al. v. The United Republic of Cameroon.61 Klockner,
which interprets Article 42 of the Convention, states that rules of
international law are given a dual role to complement and cor-
rect state law.6" Subsequent ICSID decisions have relied on
Klockner on the issue of hierarchy of norms.6"
56. Id. at 225.
57. Id. at 227-28.
58. Id. at 229.
59. Id.; but cf Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticiation of Investment
Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REv.-F.I.LJ. 1, 14 (1986) (emphasizing
primacy of domestic host law).
60. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 229.
61. Decision of the Ad Hoc Comm., reprinted in 1 ICSID Review-F.I.LJ. 139 (1986).
62. Id.
63. See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/I (cit-
ing to Kockner as authority). Excerpts of the award are reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1022
(1985).
1995]
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Broches discusses the finality of ICSID awards in the last
chapter of Part III. Admittedly, Broches wrote this piece in re-
sponse to the slew of criticisms that greeted the annulment pro-
ceedings in Klockner, Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia,64
and MINE v. The Republic of Guinea.6" While Broches is quick to
point out that the annulment proceedings have been instituted
in only three out of the twenty-four disputes submitted to ICSID
arbitration,6 6 his criticisms, nevertheless, predicted the break-
down of the ICSID system.
In examining the sections of Article 52 that provide for the
annulment remedy, Broches notes that: Section 52(1) (b) ad-
dresses violations of the excess of power provision; Section
52(1) (d) permits a request for annulment where there are seri-
ous departures from fundamental rules of procedure; and recov-
ery for failure to state reasons is found under section 52(1) (e).67
Broches discusses how each of the annulment proceedings have
treated these issues and concludes, reassuringly, that the ICSID
annulment process is "on track"6 8 and will fulfill the limited pur-
poses for which it was established. He reckons that there is no
basis for the position that the finality of awards is taking a back
seat to annulment.69
Part IV deals with international commercial arbitration.
Here, Broches flirts with other arbitral fori, in particular, the
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
system. In Part IV, Chapter Sixteen, Broches undertakes what he
calls a "superficial treatment" of other arbitration conventions
and makes suggestions for their improvement.70 Then in Part
IV, Chapter Seventeen, Broches gives a detailed account of the
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration.71 His discussion is steeped in the legislative history of
UNCITRAL'S model law. He first tells of the Commission's
choice to work toward a convention, a uniform law, or a model
64. Id.
65. ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4.
66. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 309.
67. Id. at 311-33.
68. Id. at 352.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 363.
71. Id. at 375-432. In Part IV, Chapter Seventeen Broches focuses his discussion
on the development, adoption, and effect of the Model Law on Commercial Arbitra-
tion. Id.
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law and how the Commission eventually settled on a model law.
Broches then discuses a comment made in one of the working
sessions about the difficulty of unifying procedural law.7" While
this concept may be true as a matter of general proposition,
Broches argues that it does not apply to the law of arbitration.
He notes that in arbitration national traditions, such as the dif-
ferences between common law and civil law jurisdictions, play a
relatively minor role.7"
It is also in this section where Broches delves into a discus-
sion of features of the model law including competence, con-
duct of proceedings, rules applicable to substance of dispute, set-
ting aside, recognition, and enforcement of arbitral awards."4
He then ends on his characteristicly optimistic evaluation of the
model law and praises Canada for being the first country to
adopt federal legislation based on the model law.75
Part V deals with investment disputes. Part V, Chapter
Nineteen shows the link between arbitration of investment dis-
putes and the plethora of bilateral investment protection treaties
that have evolved between capital importing and capital export-
ing countries. The remaining three chapters discuss the re-
gional perspectives to the investment dispute settlement process.
One of the issues first highlighted here is the promotion of pa-
cific settlement of investment disputes through such instruments
as multilateral and bilateral conventions, guidelines, draft codes
of conduct, and U.N. resolutions in the area of economic devel-
opment.76 ,
Broches explains that the use of these various instruments is
reflective of the differing viewpoints on the subject. The 1967
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Prop-
erty,77 for example, aims to assure the security and protection of
foreign investment. 78 This draft convention served as the basic
model for the bilateral investment treaties. 79 The OECD was to
72. Id. at 384.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 375-419.
75. Id. at 415-16.
76. Id. at 498.
77. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of the
Council of the OECD on the Draft Convention (Paris, Oct. 12, 1967) (on file with the
OECD).
78. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 498.
79. Id.
1995]
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follow this in 1976 with its Guidelines for. Multinational Enter-
prises.8" In addition, there were the various U.N. resolutions on
foreign investment, beginning with the more conciliatory 1962
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources8'
and ending with the hotly contested 1974 Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States. 2 Between these polarities lies the
Draft United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corpo-
rations.8" As Broches notes, this Draft Code reached an impasse
on account of the lack of agreement with respect to the treat-
ment of transnational corporations, and he predicts that even
when concluded, this Code is not likely to be anything but a soft
law much like the OECD Guidelines. 4
In Part VI, which he classifies as miscellaneous, Broches
ironically puts the rest of the essays in their natural context, the
context of development. In Chapter Twenty-Three he writes
about the dimensions of development. Originally written in
1973, the themes he sounds still resonate with equal clarity and
fidelity. He chastises the international community for having
failed to improve the quality of life of its poorer and weaker
members. The reasons he offers for this state of affairs are so-
bering. He writes:
[W]e failed to meet adequately the moral obligations ac-
cepted in all civilized societies since the beginning of time,
the obligations of the strong to help the weak. These moral
obligations which international law is moving, however slow-
ing and painfully, to recognize as legal obligations, exist not
only between rich and poor societies, but also between any
given society and its poor members.85
In the end, Broches challenges his audience, the membership of
the International Law Association, then meeting in Brussels in
August 1973, to take up the task of rectification. He asked them,
"to help create the conditions for economic and social progress,
with dignity and in freedom, remembering that the ultimate ob-
80. Id. at 500.
81. GA. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962).
82. GA. Res. 3821, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
83. U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990).
84. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 503. Regulations promulgated by the OECD are
considered "soft law" because they have no binding force.
85. Id. at 514.
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ject of law is the welfare of mankind."86
The subject of development is addressed again in Chapter
Twenty-Four, this time in relation to one of the principal actors
in global development: the multinational corporation. This es-
say begins with a discussion about the appropriateness of the
term "multinational corporation." Broches states flatly that
"from a lawyers' point of view the term ... has... no validity."87
His reason is that "there is no corporation that is created and
exists under the law of more than one state."88 From an entity
theory perspective89 this position is incontrovertible. From an
enterprise theory perspective, 90 however, a corporation can exist
under the law of more than one state. Better still, more than
one state might assert legislative competence over a corpora-
tion." Although Broches, in 1974, could not foresee a "multi-
national control or regulation" of foreign investment as a realis-
tic possibility,92 in 1995 it is believed to be inevitable that mul-
tinational corporations or transnational enterprises are subject
to some form of international regulation.93
In this section Broches also refers to and comments on the
issues raised by the Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the
United Nations to report on "Multinational Corporations in
World Development."94 Moreover, Broches touches upon the
unequal bargaining position between the foreign investor and
the developing countries in negotiating the entry of investment.
He believes that strengthening the bargaining capacity of host
countries is in the interest of both the investor and the host
country, and that inequitable agreements are strictly non-via-
ble. 95 To clarify, it appears that Broches meant to describe the
86. Id. at 516.
87. Id. at 517.
88. Id. at 518.
89. See PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW:
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 79-81 (1993). Entity theorists define
the term "agency" loosely, treating corporations and their subsidiaries as one entity. Id.
90. See id. at 70-79. The enterprise theory establishes that there may be separate
enterprises within a corporation. Id.
91. Id. at 78-79.
92. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 518.
93. See Matter of Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
it is not abuse of discretion to subject Swiss corporation to U.S. jurisdiction and fines for
failure to comply with U.S. subpoena).
94. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 519.
95. Id.
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inequalities between parties with regard to the negotiating skills
or bargaining skills, not bargaining positions. In fact, the bar-
gaining positions of the various sides to the investment process
are bound to be unequal.96
In addition to bargaining skills, there are other factors that
may affect the position of each party at the negotiating table. As
Smith & Wells, in their seminal book, Negotiating Third World
Mineral Agreements9 point out, bargaining positions tend not
only to be unequal but also to be dynamic. 98 For the developing
host country, this may depend on the quantity and global availa-
bility of national resources, the amount of control it wants in the
investment, whether it desires downstream or upstream integra-
tion, and other localization concerns.99 For the foreign investor,
their bargaining position will be influenced by the importance
of the technology to be transferred, its financial resources, its
managerial resources, the investor willingness to share control of
the investment, and how the particular investment relates to the
investor's overall goals.100
Broches next draws attention to the need for review of long
term development contracts. Apparently, Broches' advice has
been heeded by development lawyers, as renegotiations are now
a regular feature in most development contracts. 10 1 Broches
then raises the problem of transfer pricing but mixes his discus-
sion with the issue of host country participation in joint-ven-
tures.10 2 Ultimately, it is difficult to say what his "interesting ap-
proach to a solution" relates to.10 3
When Broches waltzes into the realm of extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. legislation to U.S. owned subsidiaries abroad, it
becomes obvious that he is out of his league. Again his com-
96. See DAVID N. SMITH & Louis T. WELLS, JR., NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL
AGREEMENTS 1-27 (1975) (discussing changing relationships in consession process)
(1975).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 6-18.
100. Id.
101. See generally Samuel KB. Ansante, Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agree-
ments, 73 AM.J. INT'L L. 355 (discussing issues related to transnational ventures that are
emerging in mineral-rich third world nations).
102. BROCHES, supra note 14, at 520.
103. Id.
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ments are strictly based upon an entity theory'0 4 and are inno-
cent of the growing extraterritorial application of antitrust legis-
lation, securities legislation, tax legislation, and an enterprise
doctrine 10 5 that is embraced with different degrees of enthusi-
asm in the developed world.
Fortunately, Broches promptly returns to arbitration and
dispute settlement where his brilliance shows once again. Essen-
tially, this is a book about arbitration and dispute settlement,
with its history told and explained by one who was present at its
creation. Broches puts international arbitration into both the
contexts of private and public international law. Even though
we may disagree with him on occasion, there is a lot of passion
and scholarship displayed in his two decades of writing.
104. See supra note 89 (defining entity theory).
105. See supra note 90 (defining enterprise theory).
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